INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND:

ROADBLOCK

TO FOURTH AMENDMENT EROSION OF
INDIVIDUAL SECURITY

Samuel Bateman*
The text of the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.,

Generally, under the guidance of the Fourth Amendment, every search or
seizure by a government agent must be reasonable. The Supreme Court interpreted this requirement to mean that an arrest or search must be based on probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.' Courts have created a number
of exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, such as investigatory detentions, seizures of items in plain view,
warrantless arrests, inventory searches, administrative searches, border patrol

searches, vehicle searches, and special needs searches.3
However, in balancing these exceptions, the Court has traditionally
required some level of individualized suspicion to justify government intrusion
on an individual's privacy. 4 In the absence of individualized suspicion or probable cause of wrongdoing, a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable.5 One
area in which courts have upheld suspicionless searches is that of the roving
police checkpoint.6 In the context of such roadblocks, the Court has tradition* William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, J.D., May 2002.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.

10, 14 (1948).
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1968) (held that a police officer may stop an individual reasonably suspected of criminal activity); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (plain view justified the seizure of an object); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976) (held that inventory searches following the lawful seizures of automobiles were
constitutional); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (warrantless entry justified to
preserve evidence from destruction); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-62
(1976) (warrantless stop of vehicle at fixed checkpoint to question occupants about citizenship is constitutional); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (held that warrantless
search of vehicle valid because police had probable cause); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (special needs of government can justify searches without warrant or probable cause).
4 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882
(1975) (holding that a roving police unit could not stop a motorist without individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing).
5 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
6 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990).
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ally used the Brown v. Texas balancing test.7 Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, a roadblock case in which the Brown test was utilized, is a recent example
of the Court favoring the government's interests over the interests of the individual.8 The Court used the Brown test to uphold sobriety checkpoints in Sitz
and border patrol checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, where the government's
interests in protecting the United States border trumped the privacy rights of the
individual.9 A recent case, Indianapolis v. Edmond, has finally eliminated

questions as to the constitutionality of drug interdiction roadblocks. 1"
Prior to Edmond, state and federal courts were divided."

Many courts

used the holding in Sitz to justify other types of checkpoint stops lacking reasonable, individualized suspicion.1 2 In fact, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in recent years has significantly reduced the public's Fourth Amendment rights
in a number of search and seizure areas.' 3 In the area of drug interdiction
roadblocks, however, the Court finally attempted to leave behind the old, allinclusive reasonableness test for a different, more appropriate test. Under the
new test, a preliminary inquiry into the program's purpose must be made before
14
the court will apply an all-out balancing based on the Brown three-part test.
The aforementioned test is nearly analogous to the standard special needs analysis, in which it is appropriate to decide first whether there is a "special need5
1
beyond law enforcement" before engaging in the three-part balancing test.
The Court in Edmond recognized a need for guidance and standardization of
the law pertaining not only to roadblock cases but Fourth Amendment cases in
general.
' See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (the Brown test weighs the state interests, the
degree to which the program furthers that interest, and the intrusion on the individual privacy
interests).
8 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.

9 See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543.
l0 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (held that because the checkpoint program's
primary purpose was standard law enforcement and criminal activity detection, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment).
" Compare State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996) and Merrett v. Moore, 58
F.3d 1547, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1995) (both upholding the constitutionality of a drug interdiction
roadblock), with United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149, 153 (10th Cir. 1992), and
United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a drug interdiction roadblock violates the Fourth Amendment).
12 See, e.g, Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 1995) (individual suspicion
not required to stop car at roadblock on public thoroughfare); United States v. O'Mara, 963
F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992) (individual suspicion not required because police utilized
highway roadblock to stop all cars leaving national park); United States v. McFayden, 865
F.2d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (individualized suspicion not required because conducted
for principle purpose of traffic enforcement).
" See Chris K. Visser, Comment: Without A Warrant, Probable Cause, Or Reasonable
Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Drivinga Car? 35 Hous.
L. REV. 1683 (1999); See generally, Douglas K. Yatter, David E. DePianto, Marisa L.
Megur & Karin Schemer-Kim, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review Of Criminal Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: L Investigation and Police Practices: Warrantless Searches
and Seizures, 88 GEO. L.J. 912 (2000).
1" See Edmond, 531 U.S. 32.
15 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997).
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Section I addresses the facts and circumstances of the law leading up to
Indianapolis v. Edmond. Section II explains the facts of Edmond and the hold-

ing of the Court. Lastly, Section III explains why the holding by Justice
O'Connor was correct and just in time to stop or at least slow a continuing
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.
I.

BACKGROUND

Probable cause has long been the standard for upholding searches and
seizures without warrants. Although the Court, in some situations, has allowed
certain searches or seizures to occur without individualized suspicion, it has
consistently found that in those cases the primary purpose of the search and
seizure was not one of standard criminal investigation. 6 This line between
criminal and non-criminal stops is critical. Since 1967, the Supreme Court has
recognized limited exceptions based on this distinction. 17 These exceptions are
as follows:
A.

Administrative and Regulatory Searches

Camara v. Municipal Court involved administrative inspections to enforce
building codes.' 8 Courts have upheld such inspections based on administrative
warrants not supported by individualized probable cause. '" The Court specifically found this type of search to be non-criminal in nature: "[t]he primary
governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional development
of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety." 20
While administrative search warrants are generally required for fire,
health, or safety inspections of residential or private commercial property, 2 '
regulatory schemes and exigent circumstances may be used to do away with the
warrant requirement.22 Often, specific evidence of an existing regulatory violation or a reasonable regulatory scheme will justify issuance of an administrative
warrant;2 3 however, the scope of the search must be reasonable in light of the
See infra text accompanying notes 18-71.
See infra text accompanying notes 18-71.
18 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
19See id. at 531-32.
20 Id. (can uphold administrative searches where the search may turn up evidence of a crim16
17

inal violation).
21 See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291-95 (1984) (warrant required for an
administrative search of dwelling to investigate the cause of fire because owners had an
expectation of privacy in partially destroyed home); Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154
(lst Cir. 1998) (warrant required for an administrative search of a business for occupational
safety hazards); Platteville Area Apartment Ass'n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 57780 (7th Cir. 1999) (warrant required for an administrative search to check for housing code
violations). But see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrant not required to re-enter
partially destroyed commercial property because the search was a continuation of the original authorized search which was stopped due to hazardous conditions).
22 See Tyler, 436 U.S. 499; Clifford, 464 U.S. 287.
23 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant needed prior to health and
safety inspections of dwellings and commercial premises); Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (same).
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circumstances.24 In Michigan v. Tyler, firefighters entered a building in an
attempt to fight a fire without first obtaining a warrant. 25 Ultimately, the exigency associated with fighting fires and the need to stay after the fire is contained sufficed to dispense with the usual warrant requirement.2 6 Notably, the
Court stated that to stay after the fire was contained and investigate if the cause
of the fire was arson would require a warrant.2 The Court in Clifford reiterated the distinction between searching the premises of a fire for the cause versus having a criminal cause in mind such as arson. 2 8 The relevant difference,
according to the Court in Clifford, is that one is a regulatory search - where an
administrative warrant may not be necessary - and the other is a criminal
investigatory search, requiring a warrant.
Administrative searches mark the first clear delineation of a difference
between types of searches and the requirement of a warrant. The Court allows
these types of warrantless searches on the presumption that the purpose of the
search is other than criminal investigation.
B.

Inventory Searches

Courts have generally found inventory searches to be constitutionally
valid as long as they are not motivated by a criminal investigatory purpose. 9
Inventory searches are allowed to protect police against claims of misconduct,
to give a general blanket of protection to police from potential dangers, and to
protect the property while it is in the custody of the police.3"
In South Carolina v. Opperman, the Court held that an inventory search
following the constitutional search and seizure of an automobile was constitutional regardless of whether the search was performed absent individualized
suspicion.3" The Court commented on the lack of a necessity for probable
cause, since the "probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers
upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions. 3 2 The
Court found the search reasonable because the search was conducted pursuant
to standard police procedures, which related to an inventory search, not a crimi24 See, e.g., Tyler, 436 U.S. 499; Clifford, 464 U.S. 287. But see, e.g., Trinity Indus. v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 16 F.3d 1455 (6th Cir. 1994) (an OSHA
inspection was not justified merely by an employee complaint that alleged limited
violations).
25 See Tyler, 436 U.S. at 512.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294
29 See infra text accompanying notes 29-35.
30 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Lage, 183
F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (an inventory search of a vehicle is valid to protect against danger
and false claims for lost property); United States v. Lewis, 3 F.3d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1993)
(an inventory search of an engine compartment deemed valid because defendant had cocaine
in his pocket when arrested); United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1989) (an
inventory search valid because police required to secure vehicle's contents).
31 See Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
32 Id. at 370 n.5.
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nal search. 33 Ultimately, the search must be conducted in good faith and only
if it can be justified by a legitimate inventory purpose.34
The distinction between criminal versus investigatory inventory searches
was reinforced in Colorado v. Bertine, where police regulations allowed for but
did not require the police to search the arrestee's backpack.35 One might think
this distinction could give police a license to rummage through one's property
in an attempt to find incriminating evidence; however, the Court now requires
that all inventory searches be undertaken according to either permissible or
required standardized criteria.3 6
Therefore, the purpose behind the inventory search must be investigatory
in nature, not criminal, and must have a component of standardized care and
procedure. Without these components, the inventory search becomes nothing

more than a judicially rubber-stamped criminal investigation, 'Violating the
Fourth Amendment.
C. Automobile Searches

Generally, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches of automobiles so long as the probable cause requirement is
satisfied.37 The automobile exception eliminates the need for a warrant based
on the impracticability of obtaining one, often due to exigent circumstances
surrounding the use of an automobile and the reduced privacy involved in the
regulation of automobiles.3 8
The Court has deemed vehicle searches constitutional in some cases even
when exigent circumstances have lapsed, as long as they existed at the time of
31 See id at 370.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1993) (an inventory search

deemed invalid since officers indicated the purpose of search was to find evidence of criminal activity); United States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). But see, e.g.,
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (inventory search deemed valid because government did
not act in bad faith or for the purpose of investigation). See also United States v. Castro, 166
F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1999) (inventory search by officer deemed valid when standard procedures were followed).
35 See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 (police discretion should be "exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal activity").
36 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,5 (1990); United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 987
(6th Cir. 1998) (inventory search did not violate Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to standard operating procedure); United States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382
(8th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). But see,
e.g., Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1175 (inventory search deemed invalid because no standardized
procedure existed).
31 See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (probable cause only requirement for
search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of a vehicle valid
because probable cause based on description of car involved in a robbery); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of vehicle valid because officers had probable cause to believe there was contraband or other evidence of criminal activity in the vehicle). But see, e.g., United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1998) (warrantless search
of vehicle invalid because no probable cause existed to substantiate search of a vehicle's
door panels for drugs).
38 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (probable cause enough for search
since expectation of privacy is lower in vehicle); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)
(same).
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the initial stop.39 Further, with regards to automobile mobility creating exigent
circumstances, courts will not use their hindsight to invalidate a search just
because exigent circumstances, in actuality, did not exist at the time of the
0
stop.

4

In sum, a warrant is needed in vehicle search cases unless obtaining a

warrant is impracticable. Since such impracticality usually exists, as long as
individual suspicion and probable cause are present, in combination with exi-

gent circumstances, a warrant is not required. However, in Edmond, there was
no probable cause. The lack of probable cause in Edmond takes it out of the
"automobile exception," necessitating a warrant.
D. Special Needs Searches
Special needs cases follow in the same vein as the previous search types,
in that a clear line has been drawn between criminal investigatory searches and
seizures, requiring probable cause, and non-criminal searches and seizures, not
requiring probable cause. In a growing number of situations, the Court has
allowed the state to avoid the normal warrant and probable cause requirements
of the Fourth Amendment when a "special need.., beyond the normal need for
law enforcement" exists that would be jeopardized if the normal individualized
suspicion requirement were held applicable. 4 Additionally, if the government
interest addresses a vital problem that can be handled effectively through the
proposed search, the requirements of probable cause or a warrant may be dismissed.4 2 Finally, the government's interest is balanced against the individual's privacy interests on a case-by-case basis, which is heavily fact-specific.4 3
There exists some debate over the methodology used in the "special
needs" arena. While the Court has traditionally begun the balancing test by
first deciding whether the search was reasonable and applying the balancing
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) (drugs discovered during an inventory search of the glove compartment justified a more extensive warrantless search at later
date); United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
40 See Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261; United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985); (warrantless search of automobile valid because probable cause existed even though automobile was
impounded); United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1993) (warrantless
search of automobile valid because probable cause existed even if defendant was not likely
to flee).
4" Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (The Court
noted that "our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant .....
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-50 (1995) (special needs of
the public school system in discouraging drug use by school children justifies suspicionless
drug testing of students participating in athletics); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(special needs of state in operating probation system justify warrantless searches of probationers' homes in accordance with terms of probation). But see, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305 (1997) (special needs of state insufficient to allow suspicionless drug testing of
candidates for public office; however, the Court found it was required to "undertake a context-specific inquiry" to determine whether special needs search is justified).
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test, the Edmond Court' ruled that the appropriate approach is to first look to
the purpose of the search or program.45 If the court found the purpose of the
search appropriate, then, and only then, would the court balance the interests of
the parties involved.46
The Court has found special needs searches permissible when there is drug
testing in the employment context based on public safety concerns; 4 7 in the
public school arena, where the students' privacy interests are diminished in
favor of order and discipline; 48 in situations where individuals are under government control or supervision, eliminating the need for probable cause; 49 and
in the area of public employment where the government's interest in an efficient workplace is great.5 °
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, the Court allowed suspicionless drug tests when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."'', To do this, the Court used a test similar to the Brown test, which balanced the interests of the government against the privacy interests of the
individual in connection with the nature of the overall intrusion. 52 However,
the drug tests could only be upheld if the government interest or "special need"
was "beyond the normal need for law enforcement." The term "beyond law
enforcement," suggests that the need at issue is not law enforcement at all;
rather, an administrative, inventory, or other similar need.53
E.

Immigration Checkpoints

While certain government officials are statutorily obligated to conduct
border searches and immigration checkpoints, the Fourth Amendment does not
require a warrant to protect the United States from illegal immigration and illeI See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

See Recent Cases, ConstitutionalLaw - Fourth Amendment - Seventh CircuitHolds That
Drug Interdiction Roadblocks Violate the FourthAmendment - Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183
F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 828 (2000); See also Robert D. Dodson, Ten
Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 258 (2000).
15

See Dodson, supra note 45.
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (warrantless and
suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees permitted so long as it is conducted pursuant to government regulations); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (warrantless and suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service employees permitted
when applying for a promotion). But see Chandler, 520 U.S. 305 (statute requiring candidates for public office to pass drug test before being eligible to run for election deemed
invalid).
48 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 (public school officials are permitted to exercise "a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults"); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (warrantless search of student's purse by school authorities valid).
41 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless search of probationer's home
valid if conducted pursuant to state regulation); Portillo v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz.,
15 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1994) (probationers and parolees have a diminished expectation of
privacy).
10 See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
46
17

5' See id.
52 See id. at 617-22
13 See generally Dodson

supra note 45.
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gal importation and exportation.5 4 What can be searched without a warrant,
probable cause or suspicion are persons, luggage, personal effects, and vehicles. 5 Immigration checkpoint stops are often routine and follow a certain
regulatory scheme.56 However, if the stop is not routine in nature, probable
cause or individualized suspicion is again necessary.5 7 The court should consider the intrusive nature of the stop and the surrounding circumstances when
deciding whether probable cause is needed.5 8
Interestingly, as in Martinez-Fuerte where the immigration checkpoint
was operated some distance away from the border itself, the so-called "border
search" exception can be construed to apply to an area that is the practical or
"functional equivalent."5 9 Government officials must look to a variety of criteria to determine what constitutes the "functional equivalent" of the border and
when such a search can be conducted.6 °
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court balanced the individual's privacy interests
against the government's interests in conducting the search.6 t In the end, the
Court allowed the roadblock, even without individualized suspicion, based on
the government's interest in protecting its borders. 62 After Martinez-Fuerte,
immigration and border checkpoints could be operated for brief primary and
secondary questioning without probable cause or individualized suspicion, but
any detention beyond that point must be supported by probable cause.6 3
4 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1999) (immigration officials may conduct warrantless routine searches); 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (1994) (customs officials may inspect the luggage of persons arriving in United States). See also United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531 (1985) (executive branch has authority to conduct warrantless routine searches).
15 See, e.g., Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531; United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265
(2d Cir. 1989) (probable cause not required for customs officials to conduct routine searches
of personal effects); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991) (no probable
cause required for search of luggage at border); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, Jr., 261
F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2001).
56 See United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
17 See Charleus, 871 F.2d 265 (probable cause required for nonroutine border search); Saffell v. Crews, 183 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).
58 See United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998).
19 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search exception
applies to search at functional equivalent of border); Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367 (same).
60 See Yatter, DePianto, Megur & Schemer-Kim, supra note 13
To determine whether a search occurs at the functional equivalent of a border: 1) a reasonable
certainty that the person or thing crossed the border, 2) a reasonable certainty that there was no
change in the object of the search since it crossed the border, and 3) that the search was conducted as soon as practicable after the border crossing ....The search may be conducted if 1)
the officials have "reasonable certainty" or a "high degree of probability" that a border was
crossed; 2) they also have "reasonable certainty" that no change in the object of the search has
occurred between the time of the border crossing and the search; and 3) they have "reasonable
suspicion" that criminal activity was occurring.
See id. at 971.
61 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
62
63

See id.
See id. at 556-63 (warrantless stop of a vehicle at a checkpoint to question occupants

valid and the vehicle may be referred to secondary inspection even without probable cause as
long as no pretext); see also Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243, 251 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (further
questioning requires probable cause).
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The Court distinguished regulatory searches from criminal searches, in
that criminal prosecution is not the principal or ultimate goal of the regulatory
search. Even though those who violate border controls were subject to arrest
and prosecution, the primary purpose of the checkpoint was to decrease illegal
immigration and increase the deportation of such individuals. In fact, Martinez-Fuerte focused on the purpose behind the roadblock and plainly called it
"legitimate and in the public interest."64
Even before Martinez-Fuerte, the Court noted that immigration checkpoints were "undertaken primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial
purposes."65 The Court stressed the difference between searches designed to
gain evidence of criminal wrongdoing and the United States' authority to conduct a search was based "on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity." 6 6 A court, having before it an immigration related search,
should balance interests only after the true purpose of the program is ascertained and adjudged not to be investigatory in nature.
F.

Traffic Safety Checkpoints and Drunk Driving Roadblocks

The Supreme Court has implied that states could stop vehicles absent individualized suspicion in a programmatic manner, if designed for the non-investigatory purpose of insuring traffic safety based on driver compliance with
licensing, registration, and inspection requirements. 67 However, the plan or
program must be neutral when dealing with privacy concerns and individual
officer discretion.6 8 The Brown balancing test was constructed for just these
situations, 69 because again, generally speaking, some degree of cause is necessary for a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to take place. 7 °
The court deemed the brief sobriety checkpoint as operated in Sitz v.
Michigan Department of Police constitutional, based on the State's interest "in
64 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
65 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278 (1973).
66 Id.
67 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (All these requirements "are essential
elements in a highway safety program.").
68 See id. Holding that:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articuable and reasonable suspicion that a
motorists is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an
occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or
other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.

Id.

69 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) ("Consideration of the constitutionality

of such seizures involves a weighting of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interests, and the severity and
interference with individual liberty.").
70 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (arrest and confession were found
unconstitutional because the defendant had been arrested without probable cause); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (lawful pat down based on reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Court reversed a conviction because
the defendant was wrongfully stopped).

Summer/Fall 2002]

INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND

preventing drunken driving."' Like Sitz, the Court has found license and
registration stops constitutional, which are primarily instituted for public safety,
not for criminal investigation.72 It is important to note that even though the
Brown balancing test was used in this case, the Court implicitly applied a primary purpose inquiry as well.7 3

In the end, the Court has not instituted a sobriety or traffic safety "checkpoint exception" to the warrant requirement. Instead, the Court has first looked
for probable cause and individualized suspicion. Then in their absence, the
Court focused on the purpose of the program, and only after that balanced the
various interests involved. In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
searches conducted without probable cause have been upheld only "in certain
limited circumstances." 7 4
Importantly, the "vehicle" or "automobile" exception only dispenses with
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in cases where probable
cause exists. 75 A driver maintains his or her privacy interests unless he or she
encounters a sobriety or traffic safety checkpoint where the purpose is not
investigative in nature and where the seizure is "carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of officers."7 6
In conclusion, before a balancing test can be applied - before the Court
can look at the government's interest, the effectiveness of the program, or the
interests of the motorist, be they diminished or fully intact - the Court must ask
if it is appropriate to use the balancing test based on the nature or purpose of
the investigation.
II.

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND

While the Supreme Court has intimated that certain roadblocks initiated to
check for licenses and registration or general traffic safety could be considered
constitutionally valid, provided they adhere to some basic principles (such as
non-discretionary action by government officers), 77 the Court has implicitly

stated that these roadblocks cannot exist for the purpose of standard crime control. 78 In 1998, the City of Indianapolis had a different idea. They began to
operate random roadblocks or checkpoints in an effort to halt the influx of
illegal drugs.7 9 Approximately thirty officers were stationed at the check-

points, which were located throughout the city, and operated at six different
times. 8 ° Approximately 1,161 cars were stopped and asked to render their
licenses and registration. 8 ' The drivers were told the nature of the stop, while a
71 Sitz v. Mich. Dep't of Police, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
72 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
73 See id.
74 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
15

See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).

76

See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).

77 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.

" See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
80 See id.
81 See id.
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drug-sniffing dog was walked around the automobile. 82 The officer looked for
signs of impairment and conducted a "plain view" inquiry of the contents of the
vehicle.83 If the dog detected narcotics in the car, the police would then search
the vehicle.8" The dog provided the officers with the requisite probable cause
needed to search the car.
The checkpoints were operated with little discretion on the part of the
police officers. 86 Officers were to stop a particular number of drivers through a
pre-determined sequence. 87 Also, the locations of the stops were determined
based on crime statistics and88traffic flow, and ultimately, the stops were to be
kept to five minutes or less.
The program resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests and forty-nine
arrests for unrelated offenses.8 9 The hit rate for drug-related arrests was five
percent and the total hit rate, including the remainder of the arrests, resulted in
a total of nine percent.9"
After James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of these roadblocks, they filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all other motorists
similarly stopped. The lawsuit had the support of the Indiana Civil Liberties
Union and challenged the searches on Fourth Amendment grounds. 9 '
The United States District Court ruled that the roadblock program was
constitutional and that the City of Indianapolis did not have to discontinue the
program. 9 2 In a 2-1 vote, a divided Seventh Circuit Appeals Court panel
reversed the decision on grounds that the purpose of the roadblock was criminal
in nature, violating motorists' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.93
Judge Posner wrote, "Indianapolis does not claim to be concerned with
protecting highway safety against drivers high on drugs ....
Its program of
drug roadblocks belongs to the genre of general programs of surveillance which
invade privacy wholesale in order to discover evidence of crime." 9 While the
majority was "not enthusiastic about the use of the Constitution to squelch
experiments in dealing with serious social problems," Posner wrote that,
"[w]hen urgent considerations of the public safety require compromise with the
normal principles constraining law enforcement, the normal principles may
have to bend.., the Constitution is not a suicide pact. But no such urgency has
95
been shown here."
See id.
See id.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999).
92 See id.
82
83

9' See id.
94

See id. at 664.

95 See id. at 663, 666.
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Judge Posner explicitly stated what the Supreme Court had been implicitly
stating for some time: the purpose of the program or search must be realized
and passed on before any balancing can be done.9 6 He went further to identify
97
First, a
four situations in which the purpose of the search was constitutional.
roadblock may be instituted to catch a fleeing criminal, since these stops would
necessarily have to be made absent individualized suspicion. 9 8 The stops
would not include an attempt to infiltrate criminal activity on the part of motorists; rather, its only purpose would be to identify the fleeing criminal.99 A
second constitutional roadblock would be one designed around an urgent consideration of public safety. The example used by Judge Posner would be a tip
to police that a car carrying a substantial amount of dynamite was entering the
city with sinister motives."0o Thirdly, an administrative search, not centered on
°
detection of criminal activity, could be constitutional.' ' Lastly, the overall
prevention of illegal importation of either people or goods, the purpose of
which would not be for criminal prosecution, would be constitutional.'0 2 The
Indianapolis checkpoint, as the majority found, failed to fall into any of these
categories.
In Judge Easterbrook's dissent, he focused on the effects of the roadblock
rather than the purpose, stating, "[o]ver and over, the Supreme Court says that
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is objective; it
3
Judge
depends on what the police do, not on what they want or think."1
Easterbrook conceded the law in this area is at best inconsistent, but insisted
that the only check on such roadblocks is the political process and the ability to
"throw the bums out" if they become too tyrannical." °
On November 28, 2000, the Supreme Court decided this case in favor of
the respondents.'0 5 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor agreed that the
Court has never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was
detection of standard criminal activity.' 0 6 The majority's decision rests primarily on two points: 1) an interpretation of the primary purpose of the roadblocks as investigatory in nature; and 2) the urgent nature of addressing issues
directly related to traffic safety and border control such as curbing drunken
driving, checking for licenses and registration, and indicting illegal aliens and
goods within purview of the border.'0 7
The petitioners suggested that since, in the cases of sobriety stops and
border stops, individuals could be, and were subject to criminal charges and
prosecution, that those cases primarily involved curbing criminal wrongdoing
96

See id.

97 See id. at 665.
98 See id. at 666.

" See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (E.D. Ala. 2001).
zoo See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 663.

'o" See id. at 666.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 667.
104 See id. at 668, 671 ("If this [Indianapolis' roadblock scheme] strikes the wrong balance,
the people may throw out of office those who adopted it.").
105 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
106 See id. at 41.
107 See id.
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and were indistinguishable from Edmond's checkpoint scheme." °8 However,
the majority dismissed this argument, stating:
If we were to rest this case at this high level of generality, there would be little check
on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable
law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily
to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little
to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life. 10 9
Next, Justice O'Connor used roadway safety concerns to distinguished the
roadblocks both in the present case along with the former border patrol cases,
from the sobriety checkpoint and license and registration checkpoints in Sitz
and Prouse." She stated that the connection in Martinez-Fuerte, "is very
different from the close connection to roadway safety that was present in Sitz
and Prouse.""' She also distinguished the border patrol case of MartinezFuerte stating that "[wihile the difficulty of examining each passing car was an
important factor in validating the law enforcement technique employed in Martinez-Fuerte, this factor alone cannot justify a regime of suspicionless searches
'
or seizures." 112
The majority did not let the problem of illegal drugs affect its decision nor
would it analogize the case to the immediate traffic safety problems existing in
Sitz, or the difficulties presented in Martinez-Fuerte.'1 3 Additionally, petitioners' argument that including a secondary constitutional purpose to the search,
such as checking for license and registration, would thus convert the illegal
search to a constitutional one was soundly rejected by the Court on the grounds
that "law enforcement authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for
virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety
114
check."
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggested that checkpoint programs can
be instituted "if they are 'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.'1 5 He also believed
that the majority took a new and unprecedented approach to dealing with roadblock and checkpoint problems, by looking first at the primary purpose of the
116
program before balancing the reasonableness of the program.
However, the majority's approach is not unprecedented, and instead puts
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence back on track, lending some badly needed
substance to search and seizure protections.
10

109

See id. at 42.

Id.

l"OSee id. at 42-43.
"I Id. at 43.
112 Id.

113See id. at 42. Stating that:
Petitioners also emphasize the severe and intractable nature of the drug problem as justification

for the checkpoint program. There is no doubt that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social
harms of the first magnitude. The law enforcement problems that the drug trade creates likewise
remain daunting and complex, particularly in light of the myriad forms of spin-off crime that it
spawns.

Id. (citations omitted).
114Id.at 46.

115Id. at 49 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
116 See id. at 52-56.
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III.

ANALYSIS

It is well established that "[a]n unconstitutional seizure may render an otherwise constitutional search invalid under the Fourth Amendment if the search
resulted from the illegal seizure or detention."' "17 It is also "well established
that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' 1 8 If a government official performs a
warrantless search or seizure without probable cause and it does not fall within
one of the specified exceptions, the court will likely find the search or seizure
invalid. While "[t]he subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment,"" 9 this principle only applies to individual police conduct based on
legitimate probable cause. It does not apply to programs designed and operated
by law enforcement for suspicionless criminal investigation.' 2 ° Obviously, if
the suspicionless search characterized as non-investigatory is nothing more
than a pretext for criminal investigation, it cannot stand. To conclude whether
a search is a pre-text, a court must engage in a purpose-inquiry before any other
analysis.
As discussed in Part II, the Court's own precedent suggests that a "purpose inquiry" must be made. In Colorado v. Bertine, an inventory search that
disclosed narcotics was upheld because "there was no showing that the police,
who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation."' 2 1 In South Dakota v. Opperman, marijuana was
found after a routine inventory search was conducted and the search was
deemed proper because "there [was] no suggestion whatever that this standard
procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive."1 2 2 In Michigan v. Clifford, an
administrative search, conducted after a fire, was allowed; however, the Court
had to determine, "whether the object of the search [was] to determine the
cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity."' 2 3 Again, the
Court suggested the necessity for a purpose in New York v. Burger. In Burger,
a statute authorizing searches of auto junkyards was deemed constitutional
since the statute was not a "'pretext' to enable law enforcement authorities to
gather evidence of penal law violations. "124 Even in the context of the "plain
view" doctrine, the Court was careful. In Texas v. Brown, after a motorist was
"I United States v. Arreola-Delgado, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (D. Kan. 2001).

118 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
"I Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000).
120 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-12 (1996) ("[T]he exemption from the
need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose
of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for
those purposes.").
121 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
122 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
123 Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) ("The object of the search is important
even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless search for the
cause of a fire may not justify a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause
has been determined.").
124 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987).
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stopped and the officer asked for the motorist's license, the officer noticed narcotics in the car. 125 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted there was "no suggestion
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might
126
be uncovered in 'plain view' in the course of a check for driver's licenses.,
While none of these cases explicitly instructed lower courts in how to
conduct an appropriate analysis, they did recognize the necessity for courts to
look first to the purpose of the roadblock and determine if the program itself
was a pretext to discover evidence of criminal law violations.
Thus, the Court created a blueprint to help lower courts determine the
legality of a search and/or seizure. First, other than the standard exceptions, all
other searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause or individualized suspicion. Secondly, and intrinsically connected to the first, the Court
must determine the purpose of the search or seizure in light of the type of
search and/or seizure in question. In doing this, the overall government program must be examined to decide if probable cause is necessary.
The Supreme Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond did precisely this.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent accused the Court of "lifting" a "non-lawenforcement primary purpose test" from another area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, namely searches of homes and businesses, which are afforded
more protection.' 2 7 Of the three dissenters, Justice Scalia did not join in this
part of the dissent's opinion. 128 It seemed that the dissent was particularly
rankled by the majority's decision not to apply the Brown balancing test, which
as the dissent suggested, was used in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte.l2 9 The dissent's admonishment to follow stare decisis, however, is a bit over-the-top, as
jurisprudence in this area is random and arbitrary in nature.' 30 In an attempt to
lend force to its argument, the dissent suggested the Court already "rejected an
invitation to apply the non-law-enforcement primary purpose test" in Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab. 131 However, in Chandler v. Miller, the majority noted
that Von Raab should be read narrowly and "in its unique context."' 32 These
types of inconsistencies can be found in a variety of areas, especially in the area
133
of "special needs."'
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983).
Id.
127 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000).
128 See id. at 48.
129 See id. at 52-53. ("These stops effectively serve the State's legitimate interests; they are
executed in a regularized and neutral manner; and they only minimally intrude upon the
privacy of the motorists.").
131 See generally Dodson, supra note 45; Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando v. del Carmen,
"Special Needs" in Criminal Justice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 203 (1993).
131Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (In Rehnquist's
dissent, he states that this case cites with approval Martinez-Fuerte and further states that it
was "in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing with police stops of motorists
on public highways.").
132 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
133See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991) (suggesting special needs has been utilized in an inconsistent manner).
125

126
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Prior to the publication of the Supreme Court decision in Edmond, a number of articles were written on the circuit court's opinion. One scholar suggested that a purpose inquiry would be difficult to manage and would open the
door to further confusion and erosion of Fourth Amendment rights. 134 Additionally, that scholar argued that an important governmental interest, such as
the interest existing in Chandler,
was to be the basis of the analysis, not the
1 35
overall purpose of the program.
Another publication suggested the majority's analysis showed a relation to
"special needs" analysis, where the "special need" or purpose must be "beyond
the normal need for law enforcement." 1 36 Of the two theories, the latter is the
most useful; however, it is interesting that nowhere in Justice O'Connor's analysis of the present case does she elude to special needs.' 3 7 Instead Justice
O'Connor engages in a step-by-step analysis of case law in the search and
seizure arena, alluding to various aspects and highlights, but never lumping all
areas such as administrative, inventory, and the like together in one category. 138 After noting these areas and their relevance in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, she suggests there is a theme running throughout the precedent
case law: primary purpose.' 3 9
The dissent counters that the primary purpose inquiry is common place for
home and business intrusions but not automobiles, because of the reduced privacy interests while driving. 4 ' The dissent's distinction is irrelevant and one
that Justice Thomas astutely questions in his separate dissent, stating his "doubt
that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable'
a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of
wrongdoing." 141
The fact of the matter is that the "non-law-enforcement primary purpose"
test is the only test that should be used in special needs and roadblock contexts.
The Court has contoured the "reasonableness" test over time, expanded it in the
late 1980s with National Treasury Employees Union and Skinner.142 Strangely
enough, the results of this "reasonableness" test have almost always been in the
state's favor. 14' This phenomenon would seem to suggest that privacy interests
"I See Shannon S. Schultz, Note, Edmond v. Goldsmith: Are Roadblocks Used to Catch
Drug Offenders Constitutional?,84 MARQ. L. REV. 571, 583-84 (2000) (arguing that while
Fourth Amendment rights should not be eroded further, the Circuit Court, "in an unprecedented move," failed to use the Brown reasonable test, thus "opening itself up to a more
subjective analysis ... opening the door for abuse").
135 See id. at 582.
136 See Recent Cases, supra note 45, at 831-33 (suggesting that the Circuit Court's analysis

poses a "threshold inquiry" into the "special need" for the program with the "purpose" of the
program).
13 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
138

See id.

139 See id. at 39-40. ("[W]hat principally distinguishes these checkpoints from those we

have previously approved is their primary purpose.").
140 See id at 53.
141 Id. at 56.
142 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
143See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upheld drug testing of federal prison guards); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Dep't of Transp.,
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in this country, are not particularly important to the Court when weighed
against the government's interests. In fact, other than Chandler v. Miller,
where political candidates were forced to submit to drug testing, the Court has
never invalidated a search program under the special needs balancing test prior
to Edmond. Interestingly and perhaps clairvoyantly, the Chandler Court,
refrained from using the balancing test until a preliminary showing of a "special need" was made. 4 ' Nonetheless, the "special needs" test should be
scrapped and replaced with a primary purpose test. By employing a "primary
purpose" test, the Court can provide some predictability to what formerly
existed as "special needs" and roadblock searches.
Since the Court has not defined what a "special need" is, the Court has
allowed lower courts to arbitrarily weigh governmental interests against virtually non-existent private interests, essentially condoning continued violations of
the Fourth Amendment.' 4 5 Usually, the government interest is the publicly
supported and popular "war on drugs."' 14 6 In fact, Justice Marshall's dissent in
Skinner, argued against the "special needs" balancing test and pointed out that
courts have allowed, "basic constitutional rights to fall prey to momentary
emergencies." '4 7 The Court adopted Justice Marshall's view in the case of
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,1 1 8 where the Court struck down a South Carolina hospital's policy of turning over urine samples showing cocaine use in
pregnant women to the authorities. While the lower court attempted to rationalize the Fourth Amendment violations away as nothing more than special
needs, the Supreme Court did not. 49 Not only did the majority dismiss the socalled urgency of the drug problem, it also followed Edmond's test and other
program's purpose and finding an unconprecedent, ultimately deciphering 15the
0
stitutional investigatory purpose.
Like with drugs and "special needs," the Court has used public safety as
an excuse to disregard Fourth Amendment protections, specifically in the context of roadblock cases. 5s Courts have upheld "special needs" searches based
on public safety in some circumstances; however, there is nothing particularly
"special" about public safety laws.' 52 In fact, the "special needs" doctrine
developed from public education cases, where the Court considered school discipline a "special need." Public education cases, however, did not deal with the
kinds of public safety laws that subsequent cases have, such as criminal laws,
traffic laws, and others.' 53 Using public safety as an inroad to destroy Fourth
932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991) (upheld drug testing of commercial truck drivers); Bluestein
v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (upheld drug testing of airline employees).
144 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
145 See Dodson, supra note 45.
146

See id.

141 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635.
148
149

532 U.S. 67 (2001).
See id.

'50 See id.
151 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (roadblock stops would be lawful in terms
of highway safety); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint constitutional since it was aimed at reducing traffic hazards created by drunk drivers).
152 Dodson, supra note 45, at 272.
153 See id. at 271-72.
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Amendment rights will result in legislatures passing laws allowing warrantless
searches and seizures, and will require courts to uphold these laws based on
public safety needs. 5 4 This slippery slope argument is particularly strong in
the "special needs" arena because it has, for the most part, come true. "Special
needs" has become a complete authorization of judicial tolerance towards government entities violating Fourth Amendment protections.
If public safety concerns always override Fourth Amendment requirements in the Court's collective view, it is worth questioning, as Justice Thomas
did in his dissent, 5 5 whether Sitz was decided correctly given the only difference between Sitz and Edmond is the distinction between traffic safety and
criminal investigation.
Justice Thomas rightly questioned the border cases such as MartinezFuerte,'5 6 where the primary purpose behind the search in Martinez-Fuerte
was a criminal investigation using immigration laws against the transporters of
undocumented immigrants and the immigrants themselves.' 57 It is true that
individuals who violated the border controls were subject to arrest and prosecution, just as those who violated other regulatory schemes were subject to arrest
and prosecution. In fact, the Court has said that as long as there is a legitimate
non-investigatory purpose, and evidence of a crime is found in the process of
the so-called legitimate search, then that evidence can be used against the indi15 8
viduals for criminal prosecution.
This result demonstrates the Court's willingness to manipulate the "reasonableness" test in order to obtain the outcome it wants, and is why "special
needs" tests should be abandoned entirely and replaced with a primary purpose
test. Some might argue that the primary purpose of the programs in Sitz,
Prouse, and Martinez-Fuerte, was not criminal law-enforcement. However, if
government officials collect evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and that evidence can be used in a criminal proceeding, then the Fourth Amendment
requirements of warrant and/or probable cause should be followed
unmercilessly.
Roadblocks are conducted largely for the purpose of investigating criminal
activity, and courts have readily followed that premise in their decisions.' 59 As
previously noted, it is not inconsistent with precedent to look at the purpose of
160
the program before conducting a reasonableness analysis.
See id. at 274.
"I See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 56 (2000).
154

See id.
"I See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
156

151 See id.; Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
159 See, e.g., Wrigley v. State, 546 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (roadblock held constitutional because its primary purpose was not to interdict illegal drugs); United States v.
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998) (evidence seized at roadblock unconstitutional
because the primary purpose of the program was to interdict illegal drugs); United States v.
Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1992) (seizure of drugs unconstitutional regardless
of the fact that the stop checked licenses as well). But see State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565
(Mo. 1996) (roadblock designed to interdict drugs upheld); United States v. Yousif, 2000
WL 1916534 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
'6o See Chandler v. Miller. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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Moreover, there is no confusion about whether a program can have a valid
secondary purpose, overriding its invalid primary purpose as some have worried the circuit court left open.' 6' The City of Indianapolis unsuccessfully
argued that the checkpoints in this case had a valid secondary purpose, checking licenses and registrations. This regulatory purpose, possibly valid under
Prouse, would then validate the roadblock program and invoke the Brown balancing test. The Circuit Court left this question open, suggesting that only one
of the purposes need be constitutional; 62 however, both parties in Edmond
163
stipulated that the purpose of the primary program was to interdict drugs.
There is further objective evidence referred to in the opinion by Justice
O'Connor, dispelling any doubt about the primary purpose of the roadblocks. 164 Use of a drug-sniffing dog would hardly be helpful in identifying
unlicensed and unregistered drivers.
Even if the City had a valid secondary purpose, checking licenses and
registration - which could pass the Brown-balancing test - the majority
answered the question as to whether a valid secondary purpose is enough to
deem the entire program constitutional. If secondary purposes could justify
illegal primary purposes, the Court noted that "law enforcement authorities
would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they
also included a license or sobriety checkpoint."' 65 Therefore, the only way to
combat such a situation would be to first evaluate the primary purpose of the
program. While the majority, "recognize[d] the challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry," they also suggested that, "courts routinely engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive
governmental conduct from that which is lawful."' 16 6 Therefore, a secondary
purpose that is valid after balancing the governmental interests against the private interests, simply will not override the primary and unconstitutional purpose of conducting drug-interdiction roadblocks.
Since Indianapolis' purpose is clearly to catch drug traffickers, a standard
criminal investigation, continuing the analysis to the Brown balancing test is
not appropriate. Thankfully, in Edmond, determining the purpose was not particularly difficult. The dissent suggested that looking into the subjective inten161 See Schultz, supra note 134, at 583-84.
162 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1999). Stating that:
If the purpose of the roadblock program were to discover such violations, and if a program
having such a purpose could be justified under the cases that allow searches and seizures without
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, then the seizure, in the course of such searches, of drugs
that were in plain view would be lawful.

Id.
163 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39-40 (2000).
'64 See id.
In their stipulation of facts, the parties repeatedly refer to the checkpoints as "drug checkpoints"
and describe them as "being operated by the City of Indianapolis in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs in Indianapolis." In addition, the first document attached to the parties' stipulation is
entitled "DRUG CHECKPOINT CONTACT OFFICER DIRECTIVES BY ORDER OF THE
CHIEF OF POLICE."
Id. (citations omitted).
165 See id. at 46.

166 See id. at 46-47.
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tions of personnel is impracticable and not warranted based on case law. 16 7
However, looking into the mental state of those establishing the program is
certainly no more impracticable than balancing undefined state interests against
apparently non-existent individual privacy interests.
At the end of the day, while drugs are of serious concern in today's environment, a checkpoint exception to the Fourth Amendment must not be created,
nor should any other exceptions. Prior cases have made the argument that the
urgency of the drug problem should produce some leeway in the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment,' 68 but the Court has been leery to explicitly state
such a proposition.' 69 The Court should also be mindful that "'the reasons for
creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to
others,' thus, allowing the exception to swallow the rule."' 170 While the Court
may be ready to create a "traffic safety exception," it should be cognizant of the
fact that the drug problem does not directly relate to traffic safety in the same
way that sobriety checkpoints and license and registration checkpoints do. If,
at the dissent's insistence, the Brown balancing test were to be the start of the
analysis, the balancing test could continue to be used as a weapon against individual rights, and would most certainly, in the case of drugs, weigh in favor of
the government. On the other hand, if the program's primary purpose is the
starting point, the Court would acknowledge the illegality of schemes such as
Indianapolis' roadblocks, irrespective of the societal problems that substance
abuse creates.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the Court's inclination to balance factors in favor of the government
in a substantial amount of Fourth Amendment cases, and with the "war on
drugs" supplanted firmly in the minds of several of the Justices, the majority in
Edmond reached a prudent decision. Realizing the inconsistency in prior decisions, the Court has set forth a roadmap which lower courts are able to follow
and has taken a step forward in re-establishing the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has become nothing more than a hodgepodge of policies, rules, and exceptions, rarely working in a cooperative fashion. Further, readers of the Fourth Amendment who suggest that reasonableness be the standard, fail to realize that with few exceptions, the government's
id. at 50-51.
168 See generally Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
167 See

U.S. 656 (1989);

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

See

Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979). Stating that:
Puerto Rico's position boils down to a contention that its law enforcement problems are so
pressing that it should be granted an exemption from the usual requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Although we have recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement when specific
circumstances render compliance impracticable, we have not dispensed with the fundamental
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizure simply because of a
generalized urgency of law enforcement.
Id.; Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 (1997) ("It is always somewhat dangerous to
ground exceptions to constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical
moment.").
17o See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273 (2000) (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393).
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interest outweighs that of the individual especially when the warrantless search
and seizure occurs outside the home or inside the car.
In Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court explicitly stated what for years had
been the obvious underlying theme of many cases involving search and
seizures: that the underlying purpose cannot be one of a criminal investigation.
If that purpose were the case, it is unreasonable in this context to seize motorists without individualized suspicion and search their automobiles through the
use of plain view tactics and drug-sniffing dogs, to look for drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Not only is the conduct unreasonable, for those who read the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as controlling, it is even more
unreasonable because no warrant was obtained for any stop. One might argue
that it is impracticable for the police to secure warrants for all cars being
stopped in what is a random roadblock. And since the automobile exception
cannot be extended without probable cause, the only option is to develop a
"checkpoint exception" or deem these stops constitutional. The Court chose
the latter.

